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Networks in Argentine agriculture:  
a multiple-case study approach
Sebastián Senesi
Fabio Ribas Chaddad
Hernán Palau
Redes na agricultura argentina: um estudo de  
caso múltiplo
A Argentina está entre os quatro maiores produtores de soja, 
girassol, milho e trigo, entre outros produtos agrícolas. As mu-
danças institucionais e políticas na década de 1990 incentivaram 
o desenvolvimento da agricultura na Argentina e na introdução 
de inovações de produtos e tecnologias (plantio direto, aumento 
do uso de agrotóxicos, transgênicos, GPS) e novos investimentos 
em plantas de crushing em soja e girassol. Além de mudanças 
tecnológicas, uma revolução silenciosa ocorreu na produção 
agrícola: de uma agricultura de autoprodução ou propriedade para 
uma agricultura com base no contrato. O objetivo neste trabalho é 
explorar e descrever o surgimento de redes no setor de produção 
agrícola na Argentina. São apresentados e descritos quatro casos 
que, atualmente, constituem cerca de 50% do plantio total de grãos 
na Argentina: forma híbrida informal, trust, estrutura orientada para 
o investidor, e rede de redes. Em todos os casos, abordam-se as 
formas híbridas envolvendo um grupo de atores unidos por objeti-
vos comuns, principalmente para aumentar a produção em escala, 
compartilhar recursos e melhorar a rentabilidade. Essas formas de 
organização são altamente flexíveis e mostram grande capacidade 
de adaptação aos desafios, além de serem competitivas, porque têm 
incentivos alinhados, flexibilidade e adaptabilidade.
Palavras-chave: contratos, formas hibridas, rede de redes,  
 
colaboração interfirma, relações. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Due to natural resource endowments and continuous productivity gains, 
Argentina is in a unique position to produce food, agricultural, and livestock 
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products. Perhaps not surprisingly Argentina is one of the lead-
ing producers and exporters of agrifood products. Argentina 
is among the four largest producers of soybeans, sunflower 
seeds, corn, and wheat; is also the world’s 5th largest export-
er of wheat, the 2nd largest exporter of corn, the 3rd largest 
exporter of sunflower seed and soybean, and the number one 
exporter of sunflower and soybean oils and pellets. For the past 
20 years, the agrifood sector has been a fundamental engine 
of economic growth as the main generator of export and tax 
revenues in Argentina.
Traditionally, farming took place in small and medium sized 
family farms, using mostly their own land, labour, credits, and 
agricultural machinery (CHADDAD et al., 2009). Producers 
owned enough equipment to cope with all required activities 
of the production season. In some specific cases, services were 
contracted for machinery with a higher specificity level in re-
lation to the area worked by the producer, such as harvesting 
services. The scale of production was limited to land property, 
and so were productivity and revenues.
In the 1990s the Argentine economy was open to global-
ization, free market rules were adopted, and state-owned 
companies were privatized. Hyperinflation was finally kept 
under control with the implementation of the currency board 
that linked the local peso to the US dollar. As a result of these 
policy changes, the 1990s were a decade of economic stabili-
ty and growth based on the convertibility rule (one peso-one 
dollar). These institutional and policy changes fostered the 
development of Argentine agriculture and the introduction of 
innovative process and product technologies, including no-
-till cropping systems, fertilizers, agrochemicals, genetically 
modified soybean seeds, precision agriculture systems (with 
the use of GPS), and new investments in modern, large-scale 
sunflower and soybean processing plants (ORDÓÑEZ and 
NICHOLS, 2003). 
In addition to these technological changes, a quiet revolu-
tion occurred in the way agricultural production was carried out 
and organized: from self-production (or ownership) agriculture 
(using own lands) to an agriculture based on contracts and 
organizational relationships. These institutional arrange-
ments were service contracts, land rental contracts, harvesting 
contracts, future markets contracts, and insurance contracts, 
among others. The agricultural production sector increasingly 
shifted to a large-scale business model, and farming expanded 
by using third-party lands in order to increase production while 
using the same capacity (fixed costs). 
As production areas expanded, it became impractical for 
framers to move their own machinery around. Agents then 
arose for local suppliers of sowing services, crop-spraying, 
harvesting, and pest control at the new production sites. In 
other words, producers started to outsource to service providers 
activities that were previously vertically integrated. A new 
business model emerged to develop large-scale, high tech-
nology agriculture through contractual arrangements among 
different actors participating in agricultural production and 
commercialization.
Producers developed complex organizational arrangements 
and business relationships involving contractors, producers, 
suppliers, processors, exporters, banks, and individual inves-
tors (some with no previous experience in the farming sector). 
These hybrid arrangements – that are neither markets nor 
hierarchies – provided the institutional framework necessa-
ry to reduce transaction costs and build trust among agents, 
such that contracts and exchange could continue to occur in a 
highly uncertain institutional and international environment. 
Nowadays unofficial sources estimate that about 50% of total 
agricultural production in Argentina is carried out by these 
hybrid organizational forms.
The objective of this paper is to explore and describe the 
emergence of new organizational forms in the Argentine crop 
production sector. Specific objectives are: to explain why these 
organizational forms emerged, and to describe their evolution 
and governance structure.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the 
theoretical framework and the methodology used. Chapter 3 
identifies the main institutional changes and the impact they 
had on the organization of farming and agribusiness in gen-
eral. Chapter 4 describes the organizational forms using the 
netchain approach (LAZZARINI, CHADDAD, and COOK, 
2001). Finally, conclusions and possible trends in the Argentine 
agricultural organizational environment are described.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND  
 PROCEDURES
2.1. Theoretical framework
In order to describe hybrid arrangements in the Argenti-
ne agricultural sector the paper introduces Transaction Cost 
Economics (COASE, 1937; KLEIN, CRAWFORD, and AL-
CHIAN, 1978; WILLIAMSON, 1979 and 1985) and organiz­
ational interdependence (THOMPSON, 1967; LAZZARINI, 
CHADDAD, and COOK, 2001; MÉNARD, 2004) theoretical 
frameworks.
The Transaction Cost theory introduced by Coase (1937) 
has become a standard framework for the study of organ-
izations. Coase (1937) introduced the notion that firms and 
markets are alternative “institutional arrangements” to govern 
transactions. In particular, he posited that the firm supersedes 
the market when the transaction costs of internal organization 
are relatively lower than in the market. In this sense, firm 
boundaries depend not only on technology, but also on or - 
g anizational considerations; that is, on the costs and benefits 
of various organizational alternatives. Building on Coase’s 
original insight, the Transaction Cost approach emphasizes that 
vertical coordination can be an efficient means of protecting 
relationship­specific investments or mitigating other potential 
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conflicts under incomplete contracting (KLEIN, CRAWFORD, 
and ALCHIAN, 1978; WILLIAMSON, 1979). Williamson 
(1991, p.271) suggests that:
“each viable form of governance – market, hybrid, 
and hierarchy – is defined by a syndrome of attri-
butes that bear a supporting relation to one another”.
Williamson (1991) concedes that Transaction Cost Eco-
nomics has focused on the study of polar forms (markets and 
hierarchies) at the expense of hybrids. Additionally, the relative 
costs and competencies of alternative modes of governance 
have received less attention than the attributes of the transaction 
– frequency, uncertainty, and specific assets. He posits that each 
generic form of governance is supported by a different form 
of contract law; and that there are crucial differences between 
markets, hybrids, and hierarchies in how they adapt to changing 
circumstances and in the use of incentive and administrative 
control instruments. Transaction Cost Economics argues that 
hybrid arrangements emerge as a result of characteristics of the 
transaction, named “attributes of transactions” (WILLIAM­
SON, 1991).
In the Transaction Cost perspective, markets and hierarchies 
are considered polar modes of governance, while:
“the hybrid mode displays intermediate values in 
all four features”. In particular, the hybrid form is 
characterized by “semi-strong incentives, an inter-
mediate degree of administrative apparatus, displays 
semi-strong adaptations of both kinds and works out 
of semi-legalistic contract law regime” (WILLIAM­
SON, 1991, p.281).
Building on this view, Ménard (2004) distils a large and 
amorphous literature on hybrid arrangements including net-
works, supply chains, franchise agreements, partnerships, and 
cooperatives. He identifies three common features or “regu-
larities” of such “strange forms”: pooling, contracting, and 
competing. Ménard’s (2004) central proposition is that hybrid 
organizations form a “specific class” of governance structures, 
combining contractual agreements and administrative entities or 
“authorities” with the purpose of coordinating partners’ efforts 
to generate rents from mutual dependence while controlling 
for the risks of opportunism. The role of contracts in hybrid 
arrangements is crucial in coordinating partners, avoiding un-
certainties, respecting property rights, and sharing quasi rents. 
Contracts achieve these purposes by selecting partners; de-
t ermining the duration of the relationship; specifying quantity 
and quality requirements; laying out procedures for regulating 
renegotiations when ex post adaptation is required; and specify-
ing rules for distributing the expected gains from joint actions. 
Because contracts are unavoidably incomplete, the stability and 
continuity of hybrid arrangements require “specific mechanisms 
designed for coordinating activities, organizing transactions, 
and solving disputes”. According to Ménard (2004, p.366), a 
core element in the architecture of hybrid organizations is the 
presence of private governments (or authorities) that “pair the 
autonomy of partners with the transfer of subclasses of decisions 
to a distinct entity in charge of coordinating their action”. These 
authorities vary in degree of formalization and centralization 
of decision making, ranging from trust to formal government.
The netchain approach, in turn, provides a complementary 
framework to analyzing inter­firm collaboration in hybrid forms 
(LAZZARINI, CHADDAD, and COOK, 2001). The netchain 
approach integrates supply chain analysis (SCA) and network 
analysis (NA) by recognizing that complex inter-organiza - 
ti onal settings embody several types of interdependencies, 
which are associated with distinct sources of value – that is, 
strategic variables yielding economic rents – and coordination 
mechanisms involved in inter-organizational collaboration. 
Three core sources of value in SCA are identified: optimization 
of production and operations, reduction of transaction costs, 
and appropriation of property rights. On the other hand, three 
core sources of value are emphasized in NA: social structure, 
learning, and network externalities.
SCA has focused on sequential interdependencies, where-
as NA has primarily dealt with either pooled or reciprocal 
interdependencies (see Figure 1). Thompson (1967) suggests 
that each type of interdependence should be handled with 
particular coordination modes. These coordination modes 
include standardization, plan, and mutual adjustment. SCA 
focuses on coordination mechanisms involving some sort of 
plan or discretionary managerial action, which according to 
Thompson (1967) corresponds to sequential interdependence. 
NA, in turn, emphasizes either standardization or mutual ad-
justments, which are appropriate coordination mechanisms to 
deal with pooled and reciprocal interdependencies respectively. 
The netchain analysis integrates SCA and NA by considering 
simultaneously all types of interdependencies that occur in 
a given inter-organizational setting. In the present research, 
both theoretical approaches – Transaction Cost Economics and 
netchain analysis – will inform the analysis of hybrid arrange-
ments in the Argentine crop production sector.
2.2. Procedures: the case study approach
The description of hybrid arrangements in Argentine agri-
culture is based on a multiple case study methodology (YIN, 
1994; STERNS, SCHWEIKHARDT, and PETERSON, 1998). 
Four different hybrid arrangements in the Argentine grain 
production sector were identified during the period 1990­2010: 
informal hybrid forms; an agricultural trust fund (known as 
fideicomiso) which has both producers and outside investors 
as partners; an investor-oriented corporate structure; and a 
large network of networks (many private nodes in relation 
with other private nodes including landowners, agronomists, 
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branch managers, contractors, and service providers). Each 
case is analyzed identifying the social structure, evolution, 
average productive area, share of information, financial sources, 
frequency of transaction, level of organizational uncertainty, 
level of trust/reputation, formality, incentives and control, and 
specific assets involved (see Figure 2).
The information needed to describe the organizational ar-
chitecture of the four hybrid forms was obtained by means of 
personal e­mail interviews (conducted in March 2010), using 
a standardized questionnaire with closed-ended questions. A 
total of 8 experts and CEOs representing the four identified 
hybrid forms were interviewed. The data collection instrument 
included general information questions regarding the develop-
ment of new organizational forms in Argentina and specific 
questions regarding coordination and control mechanisms used 
in each hybrid structure. The identities of the organizations and 
the respondents shall be kept confidential.
3. AGRICULTURE IN ARGENTINA
Over the past 20 years, important transformations have 
taken place in Argentine agriculture at the institutional, or-
ganizational, and technological levels. As explained in the 
introduction, during the 1990s the country adopted a neo-liberal 
system, reducing trade barriers and privatizing state-owned 
companies. Convertibility (one peso = one dollar) provided a 
Figure 1: Representation of Types of Interdependence
Source: Lazzarini, Chaddad, and Cook (2001).
Figure 2: Procedures Scheme
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higher level of security to investments, especially in agribusi-
ness. Moreover, privatization of ports, railways, oil companies, 
energy facilities, communication systems, highways and road 
systems, along with increased private investments, reduced 
costs of doing business. Export taxes and import tariffs on 
agrifood products were significantly reduced or eliminated. As 
a result, distortions between domestic and international prices 
were significantly reduced.
As a result of these institutional innovations, Argentine 
farmers introduced new technologies (machinery, seeds, agro-
chemicals, etc.) and better administration and management of 
their business, resulting in a more competitive way of farming, 
which led to:
•	 a 57% growth in planted area of the 4 major commodities 
– soybean, sunflower, wheat, and corn – from 14.5 million 
hectares in 1992 to 22.7 million hectares in 2000;
•	 a 64% increase in production of these 4 major crops, from 
35.5 million tons in 1992 to 58.3 million tons in 2000.
The competitiveness of the Argentine agrifood sector, how-
ever, was seriously jeopardized by a series of macroeconomic 
crises and institutional shocks starting in December 2001. Neg-
ative collective action, rent-seeking behaviour, and contractual 
hold-ups became the norm, with continuous confrontations 
among different interest groups trying to become winners in 
zero-sum games. Neither planted area nor crop production 
increased significantly until 2004.
Because economic agents did not trust the currency or the 
banking system, they were forced to develop new organiza-
tional and financial structures to decrease transaction costs, 
enforce property rights, and thereby encourage the normal 
economic activities of buying, selling, saving, and investing 
that are necessary to generate growth and jobs. This was 
precisely the case in the Argentine agricultural sector: produc-
ers developed more complex organizational arrangements 
and business relationships involving contractors, producers, 
suppliers, processors, exporters, and individual investors 
(some with no previous experience in the sector). These “insti -
tutional arrangements” provided the institutional framework 
necessary to expand agriculture to other regions (in Argentina 
and Latin America), reduce transaction costs, and build trust 
among agents. In addition, they were fundamental in allowing 
outside investors to provide capital to agricultural production 
and processing ventures, which in turn were facing binding 
financial constraints.
In this context of great institutional uncertainty and high 
transaction costs, and with growing demand for agricultural and 
food products on a global level, hybrid governance structures 
enabled Argentina to maintain and grow its leading position in 
the global agrifood system. The results are:
•	 a 32% increase in the planted area of the 4 major crops – 
soybean, sunflower, wheat, and corn – from 22.7 million 
hectares in 2000 to 30 million hectares in 2010;
•	 and a 65% growth in production of the 4 major products from 
58.3 million tons in 2000 to 96 million tons in 2010.
In summary, planted area increased 106.8% while crop 
production grew 170.4% in the 1992-2010 period (see Table 1).
4. HYBRID FORMS IN AGRICULTURE
4.1. Introduction
Traditionally, farming took place on small and medium 
sized family farms, using mostly their own land, labour, and 
agricultural machinery. Producers owned enough equipment 
to cope with all farming activities during the season; this type 
of operation was known as “administration agriculture” (agri-
cultura por administración). In some specific cases, services 
were contracted for machinery with a higher specificity level in 
relation to the area worked by the producer, such as harvesting 
services. A sequential type of interdependence describes this 
type of coordination mechanism.
By the 1990s, however, with the introduction of new tech-
nologies and increased agricultural productivity, the agricultural 
commodity sector increasingly shifted to a large-scale business 
model. As a result, farming expanded to third-party lands in 
different regions of the country. As the productive areas ex-
panded a result of regional and crop diversification, it became 
impractical to move machinery around. Agents needed local 
suppliers of sowing services, crop-spraying, harvesting, and 
pest control at the new production sites.
Table 1
Planted Area and Production of Four Major Crops in Argentina (1992-2010)
1992 2000 2010 % Growth (1992-2010)
Planted area (in million hectares) 14.5 22.7 30.0 106.8%
Production (in million metric tons) 35.5 58.3 96.0 170.4%
Source: Ministry of Agriculture Data.
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“Outsourcing became a solution for some and an 
opportunity for others. Production started to struc-
ture around a group of service companies organized 
through more or less formal contracts” (TRUCCO, 
2008).
The new business model consisted of developing large-
-scale and high-technology agriculture through arrangements 
(contracts) among different actors that participate in agricultural 
production and commercialization. The experts surveyed state 
that this has been an emergent process, based on the technolog-
ical innovations mentioned before. There were no leaders to 
promote these organizational forms, although many profession-
als sought to link knowledge to service and capital. Perhaps 
the most primitive form of hybrid agricultural organization 
was an informal hybrid arrangement. However, starting with 
the 2002 economic crisis, other actors were incorporated into 
more formal hybrid arrangements, including external investors, 
both through banks and individually. The most highly evolved 
hybrid form is the network of networks, in which different 
actors come together, based on formal and informal contracts, 
but showing strong bilateral dependency and shared objectives.
4.2. Informal hybrid forms
Informal hybrid forms were the first organizational inno-
vation to arise, at the end of the 1980s. They basically consist 
of contractual relations, mainly informal (verbal), in which 
the producers participate in a number of contracts for services 
related to grain and oilseed production (land leases, production 
inputs, sowing services, weed and insect control, harvesting, 
marketing, and storage) (see Figure 3). The business in general 
is designed to improve the profitability of the actor responsible 
for the investment and coordination (as a result of increased 
scale of operations).
Sometimes producers coordinate planting on their own 
land with the leasing of additional hectares based on the use of 
contractors’ services or their own machinery. In other cases it is 
a service provider who develops contracts with landowners to 
take advantage of their structure and minimize their fixed costs 
per unit of planted area (in this case, the contractor becomes 
a producer, not only a service provider). Contractual forms 
among the different participants vary in the way the contract 
is settled: fixed cash payments in advance or at the time of the 
harvest, or payments based on a percentage of production (i.e. 
crop share).
According to the surveys conducted, the cases of this type 
of hybrid form involve production areas that range from 3,000 
to 10,000 hectares, some of which are the property of those 
who work the land (from 20% to 30%) and some leased (fixed 
cash rent and crop share). These cases are not geographically 
restricted to any particular production region.
The transaction dimension and the endogenous dimension 
of this organizational design are presented in the following 
tables. Regarding the transaction dimension (Table 2), the 
specific asset involved in the transaction is the local know­how 
(contacts, technological know-how, etc.). The transaction fre-
quency is medium between producers and land owner, depen-
dent on market price and trust; between the producer and input 
suppliers the frequency is high, due to the suppliers’ reputation 
Figure 3: Informal Hybrid Forms
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.48, n.2, p.281-294, abr./maio/jun. 2013 287
Networks iN ArgeNtiNe Agriculture: A multiple-cAse study ApproAch 
and producers’ need for credits. Uncertainty is medium, due to 
the informal nature of the contracts. There is little sharing of 
information, and trust/reputation is not very important. 
Regarding the endogenous dimension (Table 3), there is 
one coordinator and different partners in the social structure; 
generally actors use owned capital and input suppliers credits, 
and the incentives and control are long-term contracts and 
practices that respect land sustainability. Other characteristics 
of the endogenous dimension are mentioned above.
The interfirm collaboration type may be characterized as 
sequential inasmuch as the coordinators of this hybrid form 
organizes the different activities and transactions based on a 
specific activity that involves sowing their own land or that of 
third parties, and later the harvest and marketing of the pro-
duction (according to LAZZARINI, CHADDAD, and COOK, 
2001). This form of organization is the one with the lowest level 
of specific investments (regarding the relationship itself) and 
the one that can be most easily dismantled in case the national 
and/or international conditions should not be favourable for 
agricultural production.
4.3. Agricultural trust fund (fideicomiso)
A fideicomiso is a contractual­legal figure enforced by Law 
24,441/95. There are two types of fideicomisos: financial (issue 
of participation securities to gain access to the capital market), 
and common or non­financial (private contracts between par-
ties). The fideicomiso must necessarily involve a controller, a 
role often performed by the banks in conjunction with lawyers. 
This type of organizational form arises from the need to finance 
production growth of agricultural organizations with venture 
capital and external investors (mainly since the 2002 crisis).
Figure 4 shows a typical agricultural trust fund. Basically, 
there is an investor and a group of actors, linked to an invest-
ment capital receiver (the coordinator of the organization). 
There is, in turn, a third party (generally banks) that guarantees 
that the coordinator’s obligations are fulfilled unquestionably. 
As for the purchase of input supplies – such as equipment, 
seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural chemicals – estimates are re-
quested and purchasing is done on a quality/price basis, always 
authorized by the third party. Most farm work and land leasing 
is carried out by means of contracts between service providers 
or owners and the coordinator. This type of hybrid form is not 
geographically restricted to any particular production region 
in Argentina.
In short, a hybrid organization of several actors is formed 
with the object of carrying out an agricultural activity in which 
each actor performs a specific function based on a mandate es-
tablished by the trust fund, receiving in exchange a percentage 
of the business profits or a fixed amount per service rendered 
Table 2
Transaction Dimension for Informal Hybrid Form
Transaction Dimension
Specific Assets Frequency Uncertainty Information Sharing
Trust/
Reputation
Productive and 
local know-how
Producer-land owner: medium (depends on market 
price and trust)
Producer / input suppliers: high (credits, just in time) 
Medium: informal 
contracts; ex post 
transaction costs
Low 
(individual 
investments)
Not very 
important
Table 3
Endogenous Dimension for Informal Hybrid Form
Endogenous Dimension
Social Structure Evolution Productive Area Financial Sources Incentives & Control
One coordinator 
and different 
partners
Started by the end of 1980s.
Most common organizational 
design
3,000 to 
10,000 
hectares
Owned capital and 
input suppliers
Long-term contracts (with land 
owners) because of performance
Land sustainability safeguards
288 R.Adm., São Paulo, v.48, n.2, p.281-294, abr./maio/jun. 2013
Sebastián Senesi, Fabio Ribas Chaddad, and Hernán Palau
or property (e.g., agricultural machinery or farm) leased to the 
trust fund. This type of contract is in general short-lived, since 
it is generally set up to develop one agricultural cycle, or up to 
3 seasons. This is mainly due to the short-term horizon of inves-
tors that are willing to participate in this type of arrangement.
The transaction dimension and the endogenous dimension 
of this organizational design are presented in the Tables 4 and 
5. Regarding the transaction dimension, there is a low level of 
specific assets involved from the point of view of fixed capital, 
but a medium level from the point of view of business know-
-how. The transaction frequency is low due to the short term 
contracts. Uncertainty is low, due to bank and law enforcement. 
The sharing of information is high due to the importance of 
transparency for investors. Trust/reputation should be high 
because reputation gives the providers the possibility of being 
part of the organization. 
Regarding the endogenous dimension, the formal character 
of the social structure is very important and decisions should 
be pre-informed and approved. This hybrid form generally 
uses rented land. They appeared during the economic crisis of 
2002, but now are less frequent. Each fund is typically 5,000 to 
10,000 hectares. Regarding financial sources, the trust fund has 
financial agreements with banks and investors. The incentives 
are high and all the activities should be controlled by the bank.
This type of hybrid form could be described as a pooled 
interfirm collaboration, since each individual within the group 
makes a clearly defined and differentiated contribution to a 
definite task (according to LAZZARINI, CHADDAD, and 
COOK, 2001).
4.4. Investor-oriented corporate structure
The investor-oriented corporate structure model is a way 
to organize agricultural production using capital funds from 
several partners. Although often associated with common in-
vestment funds, investor-oriented corporate structures appear 
more private, between producing parties and investing par-
ties. Starting with increased technological intensification and 
production area expansion, the different actors have to secure 
their own financing for productive processes from independent 
investors. They began during the 1990s, planting large areas in 
the pampas region (Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Córdoba). Once 
the production processes became more efficient and technology 
made it possible to reach other less stable productive areas, they 
moved to other regions in the northeast and west of the country. 
The investor-oriented corporate structure appears to be a 
more flexible organizational form since contractual forms may 
be highly varied. Investors may receive one fixed percentage-
-based payment at the end of the harvest, agreed upon before 
sowing, or they may participate in the future risks and benefits 
of the business, as a residual claimant of the system once the 
production has been harvested and marketed. This second 
option is the less frequent, since it involves a higher degree of 
trust among the parties and, very often, accounting and admi-
Figure 4: Agricultural Trust Fund Organization
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nistrative audits.  In the first case, the investor already knows 
how much money will be received at the end of the season, 
independently of production and commodity prices. In general, 
contracts are short-term, based on the agricultural season or 
year in which the investment is made.
As can be observed in Figure 5, either the producer or the 
coordinator of the system – often not a landowner – coordi-
nates contracts among different service and input suppliers 
and tenants. Production inputs and costs are mostly paid with 
external investor capital in order to obtain better prices by 
paying cash for large input volume. Regarding land leases, 
these coordinators in general choose to pay cash in advance to 
the owners of the land, because of growing competition with 
similar hybrid forms in the same production area. 
Sometimes the coordinator will sell grain to pay the inves-
tor the promised profit; often the contractors receive part of 
their payment as a crop share. The coordinator’s profit equals 
the difference between the income, on the one hand, and the 
production costs (inputs, services, land leasing) and investor’s 
participation on the other. In some cases, coordinators them-
selves invest their own capital (money, machinery, and/or land) 
in the system. Due to the openness involved in this type of 
contracts, coordinators are obliged to show great transparency 
and share information with investors.
The transaction dimension and the endogenous dimension 
of this organizational design are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
In the transaction dimension (Table 6), there is a medium level 
of specific assets from the point of view of business know-
-how (contacts, contracts, administration, logistics, etc.). The 
transaction frequency is low with the investors (generally short 
term contracts, one season), but is high with service and inputs 
providers. Uncertainty is low, due to reputation and trust (local 
actors). The share of information is high since transparency is 
important for investors. Finally, trust/reputation is very impor-
tant for coordinators in obtaining the money.
Regarding the endogenous dimension (Table 7), the social 
structure is informal with service and inputs providers but 
tends to be formal (higher security) for investors. This hybrid 
form began in the 1990s, mainly in the Pampas region, but 
expanded to other agricultural regions. It generally involves 
areas between 10,000 and 100,000 hectares depending on the 
number of outside investors. A high level of incentives is very 
important for the structure, since all participants must fulfil 
the agreement.
It should be noted that each particular actor carries their 
investments individually based on the service performed for 
the trust fund. In some cases there may exist collective invest-
ments, especially when an organization starts gaining ground 
Table 4
Transaction Dimension for Agricultural Trust Fund
Transaction Dimension
Specific Assets Frequency Uncertainty Information Sharing Trust/Reputation
Low from the point of view of fixed capital 
Medium from the point of view of 
business know-how (contacts, contracts, 
administration, logistics etc.)
Low: short-lived 
contracts (one- 
-three years)
Low 
(bank/law 
enforcement)
High, due to the 
importance of 
transparency for 
investors
High: reputation 
gives to providers 
the possibility of 
being part of the 
organization 
Table 5
Endogenous Dimension for Agricultural Trust Fund
Endogenous Dimension
Social Structure Evolution Productive Area Financial Sources Incentives & Control
Formal
Decision-making acquires 
greater transparency
In general with rented land
Since 2002, 
increased rapidly. 
Nowadays, due to 
institutional hazards, 
they are less 
common.
5,000 to 10,000 
hectares
Financial agreements 
with banks
High: actors are willing 
to participate
All activities are 
controlled by the bank
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Table 6
Transaction Dimension for Investor-Oriented Corporate Structure
Transaction Dimension
Specific Assets Frequency Uncertainty Information Sharing Trust/Reputation
Medium from the point of view of 
business know-how (contacts, 
contracts, administration, logistics 
etc.)
Low with investors 
(one season)
High with service and 
inputs providers
Low: depends 
on reputation 
and trust
High: investors 
know what would be 
produced and how
Very important to 
obtain money in 
advance
Table 7
Endogenous Dimension for Investor-Oriented Corporate Structure
Endogenous Dimension
Social Structure Evolution Productive Area
Financial 
Sources Incentives & Control
Coordinator-outside investors- 
-service and inputs providers
Tends to be formal (higher 
security for investors)
Started in 1990s, mainly in 
Pampas region; subsequent 
expansion to other agricultural 
regions
10,000 to 
100,000 
hectares
Outside 
investors
High, since all participants 
must fulfil the agreement
Figure 5: Investor-Oriented Corporate Structure Organization
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.48, n.2, p.281-294, abr./maio/jun. 2013 291
Networks iN ArgeNtiNe Agriculture: A multiple-cAse study ApproAch 
and partnerships between service providers and coordinators 
last longer. In this case there may appear shared fixed capital 
investments in storage, machinery, and logistics. Finally, this 
hybrid form may be considered a pooled form, according to 
the classification proposed by Lazzarini, Chaddad, and Cook 
(2001).
4.5. Network of networks
The strategy of this type of organization is based on creating 
a network of contractors with local, specific knowledge. These 
contractors may be investment partners or network service 
providers. Generally, the whole network is kept in a specific 
area of influence, but this know­how has been spread to other 
regions beyond traditional ones.
The model of this type of organization involves a co-
ordinator of the network and technical people in charge of 
production and the network’s activities in each region (see 
Figure 6). The different activities are production (sowing and 
pulverizations), harvesting, storage, agricultural input selling, 
trading, financial services, etc. (depending on the network). 
The network of networks is structured as a multidivisional 
form with different business units in different regions: each 
unit is important to the contribution of the network. The areas 
of influence have generated the network of branches. In these 
branch offices grain is purchased, inputs are sold and business 
contacts explored.
The coordinator “opens” business units in different regions 
similarly to a franchise system. A network of networks could 
be characterized as a sum of formal and informal networks in 
different regions, coordinated by a central manager (in Figure 
6, “local coordinator”). The reputation of the coordinator is 
very important for developing the region and expanding the 
network. The conditions offered by the coordinator often are 
sufficient for striking a bargain between similar agents in the 
region. As a result, a network of networks has long-term con-
tracts (more than five years) with participants as a means to 
establish itself in a region, centrally coordinated but enhancing 
the empowerment of each partner.
The transaction dimension and the endogenous dimension 
of this organizational design are presented in the following 
tables. Regarding the transaction dimension (Table 8), there is 
a high level of specific assets from the point of view of busi-
ness know-how (contacts, contracts, administration, logistics, 
Figure 6: Network of Networks Organization
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Table 8
Transaction Dimension for Network of Networks
Transaction Dimension
Specific Assets Frequency Uncertainty Information Sharing Trust/Reputation
High: know-how, 
innovations (tech), 
human resources
High: long-term 
relationships (credible 
commitments)
Low (importance of trust)
Processes are standardized
Very high
Trust is the result of 
transparent operations and 
solvency of the network
Table 9
Endogenous Dimension for Network of Networks
Endogenous Dimension
Social Structure Evolution Productive Area Financial Sources Incentives & Control
Local coordinator (know-how, 
contacts), professional HH.RR
Management is totally 
decentralized
Each responsible person 
loads the information at his 
own workplace
Started by 1990s, 
mainly in Pampas 
region, expanded 
to other agricultural 
regions and countries
High level of 
technology
20,000 to 
350,000 hectares 
(neighbouring 
countries such 
as Uruguay and 
Paraguay)
Generally contracting
Own budget, input 
providers, foreign 
investors, banks, 
equity markets
Include financial 
assistance for member 
of the network
Very high, 
since all 
participants 
must fulfil the 
agreement
etc.), technological innovations (GPS, no-tilling systems, etc.) 
and human resources. Frequency is high due to the long­term 
contracts creating credible commitments. This, along with the 
standardized processes, allows for lower uncertainty. Infor-
mation sharing is very high, and so is the trust and reputation 
of the coordinator.
Regarding the endogenous dimension (Table 9), the social 
structure has a local coordinator with a high level of local 
know-how, but management is totally centralized. This hybrid 
form started in the 1990s in the Pampas region and expanded 
to other regions, as well as other countries (Uruguay, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Bolivia), involving productive areas from 20,000 
to 350,000 hectares. Financially speaking, coordinators use 
their own budget, but they also include foreign investors, 
banks, equity markets, and members of the network. Finally, 
incentives and control are very high, since all participants must 
fulfil the agreement.
This organizational form could be represented as a reci-
procal interfirm collaboration (LAZZARINI, CHADDAD, 
and COOK, 2001).
5. CONCLUSIONS
The study of hybrid forms in Argentine agriculture allows 
researchers and managers to better understand organizational 
innovation in a global and local perspective. Starting with the 
innovations of the 1990s, farmers/producers, service providers, 
and input suppliers developed a complex contracting system 
in order to expand agricultural production to until then almost 
virgin areas. Main organizational forms were the “informal 
hybrid form” and the “investor-oriented corporate structure”, 
and most recently the “network of networks”. These institu-
tional arrangements were supported in informal relationships, 
accompanied by high levels of trust, reputation, and symmetry 
of information. 
Following the Argentine economic crisis in 2001 and 2002, 
these actors also started to create alliances with other actors 
outside the formal agrifood business circuit. Banks, financial 
organizations and even common people began to finance the 
agricultural sector. The institutional and financial crisis also 
generated an environment with lower trust, resulting in the 
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necessity of more formal contracts. For this reason, during the 
period 2002-2007 the “agricultural trust-fund” and “investor-
-oriented corporate structure” organizational forms saw a rapid 
increase. 
Informal contracts seem to be the most common way of 
organizing the agriculture process, but these are short term 
and marked by sequential interfirm collaboration. Networks of 
networks involve long-term relationships and social develop-
ment, and reciprocal interfirm collaboration. Agricultural trust 
funds and investor-oriented corporate structures have combined 
interfirm collaboration and medium­term relationships. In all 
cases, hybrid forms involve a group of actors linked by common 
objectives, mainly to gain scale, share resources, and improve 
the profitability of the business.
Agricultural contracts constitute autonomous specialized 
nodes that work in a coordinated fashion, assisted by modern 
information and communication technologies (ICT), trust, a 
shared vision, and the capacity to coordinate different agricul-
tural processes. These organizations are competitive because 
they enjoy aligned incentives, flexibility, and adaptability. The 
more hectares the organizational form has, the more reciprocal 
or combined is the interfirm collaboration. High uncertainty due 
to information problems leads to more certain organizational 
interactions.
The experts surveyed state that these organizational forms 
are highly flexible and show a great capacity to adapt to the 
challenges. For instance, during 2008 and 2009 two restric-
tions appeared in the sector: institutional intervention (with 
higher export taxes) and an important drought. As a result 
those organizational forms with non-agricultural investors 
(especially the agricultural trust fund and investor-oriented 
corporate structure) faded from the system, driving other 
players in the chain (i.e. industry or exporters) to develop new 
organizational forms through network of networks, service 
providers (contractors), or informal hybrid forms, by financing 
inputs or land renting, in order secure the supply of grains. It 
could be characterized as a sequential interfirm collaboration, 
but with strong contracts and combined relationships; it is a 
typical netchain organization.
All that is left is to ask whether this type of highly compet-
itive organizational design will be sustainable and continue to 
dominate Argentine agricultural production. The risk is that, if 
it does not function correctly or the institutional environment 
constrains its development, the design will crumble, and the 
autonomous nodes could be more vulnerable to transaction 
costs. This could result in lower investments, lower use of 
workforce, lower specialization, lower productivity, or even 
occupying the land with low-cost crops (i.e. soybean).
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Networks in Argentine agriculture: a multiple-case study approach
Argentina is among the four largest producers of soybeans, sunflower, corn, and wheat, among other agricultural 
products. Institutional and policy changes during the 1990s fostered the development of Argentine agriculture and 
the introduction of innovative process and product technologies (no­till, agrochemicals, GMO, GPS) and new in-
vestments in modern, large­scale sunflower and soybean processing plants. In addition to technological changes, a 
“quiet revolution” occurred in the way agricultural production was carried out and organized: from self-production 
or ownership agriculture to a contract-based agriculture. The objective of this paper is to explore and describe the 
emergence of networks in the Argentine crop production sector. The paper presents and describes four cases that cur-
rently represent about 50% of total grain and oilseed production in Argentina: “informal hybrid form”, “agricultural 
trust fund”, “investor-oriented corporate structure”, and “network of networks”. In all cases, hybrid forms involve a 
group of actors linked by common objectives, mainly to gain scale, share resources, and improve the profitability of 
the business. Informal contracts seem to be the most common way of organizing the agriculture process, but using 
short­term contracts and sequential interfirm collaboration. Networks of networks involve long­term relationships 
and social development, and reciprocal interfirm collaboration. Agricultural trust fund and investor­oriented corpo-
rate structures have combined interfirm collaboration and medium­term relationships. These organizational forms 
are highly flexible and show a great capacity to adapt to challenges; they are competitive because they enjoy aligned 
incentives, flexibility, and adaptability.
Keywords: contracts, hybrid forms, network of networks, interfirm collaboration, relationships.
Redes en la agricultura argentina: un estudio de caso múltiple
La Argentina está entre los cuatro mayores productores mundiales de soja, girasol, maíz y trigo, entre otros productos 
agrícolas. Los cambios institucionales y políticos que ocurrieron en la década de 1990 fomentaron el desarrollo de 
la agricultura argentina y la introducción de innovaciones de productos y tecnologías (siembra directa, mayor uso de 
agroquímicos, cultivos transgénicos, GPS) y las nuevas inversiones en plantas de crushing en soja y girasol. Además 
de los cambios tecnológicos, una revolución silenciosa tuvo lugar en la producción agrícola: de la agricultura de 
autoproducción o propiedad a una agricultura basada en el contrato. El objeto en este trabajo es explorar y describir 
la aparición de redes en el sector de producción agrícola en Argentina. Se presentan y describen cuatro casos que 
actualmente representan aproximadamente el 50% del total de siembra de granos en el país: forma híbrida informal, 
fideicomiso, estructura orientada hacia los inversores y red de redes. En todos los casos, se analizan las formas hí-
bridas que involucran a un grupo de actores unidos por objetivos comunes, principalmente con el fin de aumentar 
la escala de producción, compartir recursos y mejorar la rentabilidad del negocio. Estas formas de organización son 
muy flexibles y muestran una gran capacidad de adaptación a los desafíos. Además, son competitivas porque cuentan 
con incentivos alineados y flexibilidad.
Palabras clave: contratos, formas híbridas, red de redes, colaboración entre empresas, relaciones.
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